PART IV
CONTAINING ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS
CHAPTER III
THAT GREAT
OBJECTION AGAINST THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, CONSIDERED,
THAT SUCH IMPUTATION IS UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE, INASMUCH AS ADAM AND HIS
POSTERITY ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME. WITH A BRIEF REFLECTION SUBJOINED OF WHAT
SOME HAVE SUPPOSED, OF GOD IMPUTING THE GUILT OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY,
BUT IN AN INFINITELY LESS DEGREE THAN TO ADAM HIMSELF.
THAT
we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections
against supposing the guilt of Adam’s sin to be imputed to his posterity; I
would premise some observations with a view to the right stating of the
doctrine; and then show its reasonableness, in opposition to the great
clamor raised against it on this head.
I think, it would
go far towards directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of
this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: that God, in every step of
his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution
established with him, looked on his posterity as being one with him. And
though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the head of the
whole body, and the root of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with
him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their
root.
From which it will
follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of
heart, came upon Adam’s posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he
and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for
the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or
root of the whole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding every
alteration in the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same
alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think, this
will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a constituted oneness
or identity of Adam and his posterity in this affair.
Therefore I am
humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into
the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam’s sin, another the
guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived
of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at first existence, is
one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the
sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising
from the depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two things,
distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God. Indeed the
guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed
principle, and appears in its consequent operations, is a distinct and
additional guilt: but the guilt arising from the first existing of a
depraved disposition in Adam’s posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct
from their guilt of Adam’s first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The
first evil disposition or inclination of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct
from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed
was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded
from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had double,
as for two distinct sins: one, the wickedness of his will in that affair;
another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by it. His guilt was all
truly from the act of his inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body
were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in
wickedness of heart, fully sufficient for, and entirely amounting to,
all that appeared in the act he committed.
The depraved
disposition of Adam’s heart is to be considered two ways. (1.) As the first
rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin,
and the ground of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of heart continuing
afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came by God’s forsaking of him;
which was a punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed
corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt
on his soul.
In like manner,
depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s posterity. The first
existing of a corrupt disposition, is not to be looked upon as sin distinct
from their participation of Adam’s first sin. It is as it were the extended
pollution of that sin, through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union
of the branches with the root; or the inherence of the sin of that
head of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the
head in that first act. But the depravity of nature remaining as an established
principle in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is a consequence
and punishment of the first apostasy thus participated, and brings
new guilt. The first being of an evil disposition in a child of Adam,
whereby he is disposed to approve the sin of his first father, so far as
to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be
looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than
the full consent of Adam’s own heart in the act of sinning; which was not
consequent on the imputation, but rather prior to it in the order of
nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to Adam’s posterity, or
rather, the coexistence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam’s
first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the
union that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and
his posterity; but not properly a consequence of the imputation of
his sin; nay, is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The
first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the
consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil
disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it
was in the case of Adam himself.
The first existence
of an evil disposition, amounting to a full consent to Adam’s sin, no more
infers God being the author of that evil disposition in the child, than
in the father. The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in
the heart of Adam, was by God’s permission; who could have prevented
it, if he had pleased, by giving such influences of his Spirit, as would
have been absolutely effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold:
and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian will
presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God’s holiness and
righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had been guilty of no offense before.
So root and branches being one, according to God’s wise constitution, the case
in fact is, that by virtue of this oneness answerable changes or effects through
all the branches coexist with the changes in the root: consequently
an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam’s posterity, equivalent to
that which was exerted in his own heart, when he eat the forbidden fruit. Which
God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an influence, as
might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former
chapter [See also p. 39, note, § 8, etc. 48 § 12, etc. 80 § 9, etc. 82
§ 17, etc. 121 § 7, etc.].
But now the grand
objection is against the reasonableness of such a constitution, by
which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as one, and dealt with
accordingly, in an affair of such infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned,
they must necessarily be made sinners by his disobedience, and come into
existence with the same depravity of disposition, and be looked upon and
treated as though they were partakers with him in his act of sin. I have not
room here to rehearse all Dr. T.’s vehement exclamations against the
reasonableness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure consult his
book, and see them in the places referred to below [Page 13. 150, 151, 156, 261.
108, 109, 111. S.]. Whatever black colors and frightful representations are
employed on this occasion, all may be summed up in this, That Adam and his
posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents. But with
respect to this mighty outcry made against the reasonableness of any such
constitution, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as
one, I would make the following observations.
I. It signifies
nothing to exclaim against plain fact. Such is the fact, the most
evident and acknowledged fact, with respect to the state of all mankind,
without exception of one individual among all the natural descendants of Adam,
as makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his posterity as one,
in reference to his apostasy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has
been demonstrated, and shown to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every
individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as that there
is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating God’s holy law (if
they ever live to act at all as moral agents), and being thereby justly exposed
to eternal ruin [Part I Chap. I, the three first sections.]. And God either thus
deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as one with their first
father, and so treats them as sinful and guilty by his apostasy;
or (which will not mend the matter) he, without viewing them as at all
concerned in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly innocent,
subjects them nevertheless to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by his sin
was exposed to the calamities and sorrows of this life, to temporal
death and eternal ruin; as is confessed. And it is also in effect confessed,
that all his posterity come into the world in such a state, as that the certain
consequence is their being exposed, and justly so, to the sorrows
of this life, to temporal death, and eternal ruin, unless saved by
grace. So that we see, God in fact deals with them together, or as one.
If God orders the consequences of Adam’s sin, with regard to his posterity’s
welfare — even in those things which are most important, and which in the
highest degree concern their eternal interest — to be the same with the
consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as one in
that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with difficulty, fact obliges
us to get over it, either by finding out some solution, or by shutting
our mouths, and acknowledging the weakness and scantiness of our understandings;
as we must in other innumerable cases, where apparent and undeniable fact,
in God’s works of creation and providence, is attended with events and
circumstances, the manner and reason of which are difficult to our
understandings. — But to proceed.
II. We will
consider the difficulties themselves, insisted on in the objections of
our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: First, that such a
constitution is injurious to Adam’s posterity. Secondly, that it
is altogether improper, as it implies falsehood, viewing and
treating those as one, which indeed are not one, but entirely distinct.
FIRST difficulty.
That appointing Adam to stand, in this great affair, as the moral head
of his posterity, and so treating them as one with him, as standing
or falling with him, is injurious to them. To which I answer, it is
demonstrably otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being injurious
to Adam’s posterity, any more than if everyone had been appointed to stand
for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, attended with a more
eligible probability of a happy issue than the latter would have
been: and so a constitution that truly expresses the goodness of its
Author. For,
1. It is reasonable
to suppose, that Adam was as likely, on account of his capacity
and natural talents, to persevere in obedience, as his posterity (taking
one with another), if they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves.
And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his
posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this
constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience,
as of the ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.
2. There was a greater
tendency to a happy issue, in such an appointment, than if everyone had been
appointed to stand for himself; especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam had
stronger motives to watchfulness than his posterity would have had; in
that not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his
posterity: (2.) Adam was in a state of complete manhood, when his
trial began. It was a constitution very agreeable to the goodness of God,
considering the state of mankind, which was to be propagated in the way of
generation, that their first father should be appointed to stand for all.
For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state of infancy,
and their coming so gradually to mature state, and so remaining for a
great while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after they
were become moral agents, they would be less fit to stand for themselves,
than their first father to stand for them.
If any man,
notwithstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part, if the affair
had been proposed to him, he should have chosen to have had his
eternal interest trusted in his own hands: it is sufficient to answer,
that no man’s vain opinion of himself, as more fit to be trusted than
others, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are
in themselves. Nor is it a just objection, that this constitution has in event
proved for the hurt of mankind. For it does not follow, that no
advantage was given for a happy event, in such an establishment, because
it was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other
event.
3. The goodness of
God in such a constitution with Adam appears in this: that if there had
been no sovereign gracious establishment at all, but God had proceeded
only on the basis of mere justice, and had gone no further than this
required, he might have demanded of Adam and all this posterity, that
they should perform perfect perpetual obedience, without ever failing in
the least instance, on pain of eternal death; and might have made this
demand without the promise of any positive reward for their
obedience. For perfect obedience is a debt, that everyone owes to his
Creator; and therefore is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None
is obliged to pay his debtor for discharging his just debt. — But such was
evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the
consequence of his persevering fidelity, to all such as were included within
that constitution (of which the tree of life was a sign), as well as
eternal death to be the consequence of his disobedience. — I come now to
consider the
SECOND difficulty.
— It being thus manifest, that this constitution, by which Adam and his
posterity are dealt with as one, is not unreasonable on account of its
being injurious and hurtful to the interest of mankind, the only
thing remaining in the objection, against such a constitution, is the impropriety
of it, as implying falsehood, and contradiction to the true nature of
things; as hereby they are viewed and treated as one, who are not one,
but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be
true, which in itself considered is not true.
This objection,
however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of
what we call sameness or oneness, among created things; and the
seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree,
in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on
the sovereign constitution and law of the supreme Author and Disposer of the
universe.
Some things are entirely
distinct, and very diverse, which yet are so united by the
established law of the Creator, that by virtue of that establishment, they are
in a sense one. Thus a tree, grown great, and a hundred years old,
is one plant with the little sprout, that first came out of the
ground from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant succession;
though it is now so exceeding diverse, many thousand times bigger, and of
a very different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same: yet God,
according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession
communicated to it many of the same qualities, and most important properties, as
if it were one. It has been his pleasure, to constitute an union in these
respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all as one.
— So the body of man at forty years of age, is one
with the infant body which first came into the world, from whence it
grew; though now constituted of different substance, and the greater part of the
substance probably changed scores (if not hundreds) of times: and though it be
now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the course of
nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has caused, that in a certain
method it should communicate with that infantile body, in the same life,
the same senses, the same features, and many the same qualities, and in union
with the same soul; and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt with by
him as one body. Again, the body and soul of a man are one,
in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in
themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse as can
be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine constitution, or law of nature,
which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become one,
in most important respects; a wonderful mutual communication is established; so
that both become different parts of the same man. But the union and
mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated and
limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution he has
been pleased to establish.
And if we come even
to the personal identity of created intelligent beings, though this be
not allowed to consist wholly in what Mr. Locke supposes, i.e. Same
consciousness; yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one thing
essential to it. But it is evident, that the communication or continuance of the
same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of
duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity,
that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by
an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. — If any should here insist, that
there is no need of having recourse to any such constitution, in order to
account for the continuance of the same consciousness; and should say,
that the very nature of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for
it, its ideas and consciousness being retained, according to the course of
nature: then let it be remembered, who it is that gives the soul this
nature; and let that be remembered, which Dr. T. says of the course of nature,
before observed; denying, that the course of nature is a proper active cause,
which will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it; saying,
that the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or
nothing; and affirming, that it is absolutely impossible, the course of
nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than
produce itself (Page 134. S); and that God, the original of all being, is
the ONLY CAUSE of all natural effects (Page 140. S). Here it is worthy also
to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull says of the laws of nature, as cited
from Sir Isaac Newton (Mor. Phil. p. 7). “It is the will of the mind that is
the first cause, that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those laws,
who is the efficient cause that produces the phænomena, which
appear in analogy, harmony, and agreement, according to these laws.”
And, “the same principles must take place in things pertaining to moral as
well as natural philosophy” (Mor. Phil. p. 9).
From these things
it will clearly follow, that identity of consciousness depends wholly on
a law of nature; and so, on the sovereign will and agency of God.
And therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution
and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution;
and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the
only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that,
suppose sameness of substance requisite. Or, if same consciousness be one
thing necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God’s sovereign constitution,
it will still follow that person identity depends on God’s sovereign constitution.
And with respect to
the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its
duration, I think we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that
absolute, independent identity of the FIRST BEING, whereby he is the same
yesterday, today, and forever. Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated,
that even this oneness of created substance, existing at different times, is a
merely dependent identity; dependent on the pleasure and sovereign
constitution of him who worketh all in all. This will follow from what is
generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all things,
and gave them being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them
in being. This being a matter of considerable importance, it may be worthy here
to be considered with a little attention. Let us inquire therefore, in the first
place, whether it be not evident, that God does continually, by his immediate
power, uphold every created substance in being; and then let us see the consequence.
That God does, by
his immediate power, uphold every created substance in being, will be
manifest, if we consider that their present existence is a dependent existence,
and therefore is an effect and must have some cause; and the cause
must be one of these two; either the antecedent existence of the same
substance, or else the power of the Creator. But it cannot be the antecedent
existence of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of
the moon, at this present moment, cannot be the effect of its
existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last
moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this also is to be
considered, that no cause can produce effects in a time and place in
which itself is not. It is plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, when
and where it is not existing. But the moon’s past existence was
neither where nor when its present existence is. In point of time,
what is past entirely ceases, when present existence begins;
otherwise it would not be past. The past moment has ceased, and is gone,
when the present moment takes place; and no more coexists with it, than
any other moment that had ceased, twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence
of the particles of this moving body produce effects in any other
place, than where it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in
every point of it, is in a different place, from where its existence was
at the last preceding moment. From these things, I suppose, it will certainly
follow, that the present existence, either of this, or any other created
substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so to
speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space or
duration, though ever so near one to another, do not at all coexist
one with the other; and therefore are as truly different effects, as if those
parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder. And the prior existence
can no more be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next moment, or
next part of space, than if it had been in an age before, or at a thousand
miles’ distance, without any existence to fill up the intermediate time or
space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment,
must be the effect of the immediate agency, will, and power of God.
If any shall insist
upon it, that their present existence is the effect or consequence of past
existence, according to the nature of things; that the established course
of nature is sufficient to continue existence once given; I allow it.
But then it should be remembered, what nature is in created things; and what
the established course of nature is; that, as has been observed
already, it is nothing, separate from the agency of God; and that, as Dr.
T. says, God, the original of all being, is the ONLY cause of all natural
effects. A father, according to the course of nature, begets a child; an
oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud; so
according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree
is followed by its new or present existence. In one case, and the other, the new
effect is consequent on the former, only by the established laws and settled
course of nature; which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate
efficiency of God, according to a constitution that he has been pleased
to establish. Therefore, according to what our author urges, as the child and
the acorn which come into existence according to the course of nature, in
consequence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the oak, are
truly immediately created by God; so must the existence of each created
person and thing, at each moment, be from the immediate continued creation
of God. It will certainly follow from these things, that God’s preserving of
created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation,
or to his creating those things out of nothing at each moment of their
existence. If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on
God’s preservation, then those things would drop into nothing upon the
ceasing of the present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to
cause them to exist in the following moment. If there be any who own, that God preserves things in
being, and yet hold that they would continue in being without any further help
from him, after they once have existence; I think, it is hard to know what they
mean. To what purpose can it be, to talk of God preserving things in
being, when there is no need of his preserving them? Or to talk of their
being dependent on God for continued existence, when they would of
themselves continue to exist, without his help; nay, though he should wholly
withdraw his sustaining power and influence?
It will follow from
what has been observed, that God’s upholding of created substance, or causing
of its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an immediate
production out of nothing, at each moment. Because its existence at this
moment is not merely in part from God, but wholly from him; and not in
any part, or degree, from its antecedent existence. For, to suppose that
its antecedent existence concurs with God in efficiency, to
produce some part of the effect, is attended with all the very same
absurdities, which have been shown to attend the supposition of its producing it
wholly. Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper
influence or assistance in the affair: and consequently God produces the
effect as much from nothing, as if there had been nothing before.
So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially;
as, in the first creation there had been no such act and effect of
God’s power before: whereas, his giving existence afterwards, follows
preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an established order.
Now, in the next
place, let us see how the consequence of these things is to my present
purpose. If the existence of created substance, in each successive
moment, be wholly the effect of God’s immediate power, in that moment,
without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of nothing,
then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect; and
simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though
it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method. And
there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the arbitrary
establishment so unites these successive new effects, that he treats them
as one, by communicating to them like properties, relations, and
circumstances; and so, leads us to regard and treat them as one.
When I call this an arbitrary constitution, I mean, that it is a
constitution which depends on nothing but the divine will; which divine
will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom. In this sense, the whole course
of nature, with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods, constancy
and regularity, continuance and proceeding, is an arbitrary constitution.
In this sense, the continuance of the very being of the world and all its parts,
as well as the manner of continued being, depends entirely on an arbitrary
constitution. For it does not at all necessarily follow, that because
there was sound, or light, or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or
consciousness, or any other dependent thing the last moment, that therefore
there shall be the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a
constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment ,as the colors
of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all
is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun. In him we live, and
move, and have our being.
Thus it appears, if
we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness
in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God’s
sovereign constitution. And so it appears, that the objection we are
upon, made against a supposed divine constitution, whereby Adam and his
posterity are viewed and treated as one, in the manner and for the
purposes supposed — as if it were not consistent with truth, because no
constitution can make those to be one, which are not one — is
built on a false hypothesis: for it appears, that a divine constitution is
what makes truth, in affairs of this nature. The objection supposes,
there is a oneness in created beings, whence qualities and relations are derived
down from past existence, distinct from, and prior to, any oneness
that can be supposed to be founded on divine constitution. Which is
demonstrably false; and sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the
adversaries themselves: and therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.
There are various
kinds of identity and oneness, found among created things, by which they
become one in different manners, respects, and degrees, and to various
purposes; several of which differences have been observed; and every kind is
ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect, by divine constitution.
Some things, existing in different times and places, are treated by their
Creator as one in one respect, and others in another; some are
united for this communication, and others for that; but all
according to the sovereign pleasure of the fountain of all being and
operation.
It appears,
particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by virtue whereof pollution
and guilt from past wickedness are derived, depends entirely
on a divine establishment. It is this, and this only, that must account
for guilt and an evil taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime
committed twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the
world, and forever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such
thing, and where, as consciousness of acts that are past; and for the
continuance of all habits, either good or bad: and on this depends
everything that can belong to personal identity. And all communications,
derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties, or relations, natural or
moral, from what is past, as if the subject were one depends on no
other foundation.
And I am persuaded,
that no solid reason can be given, why God — who constitutes all other created
union or oneness according to his pleasure, and for what purposes,
communications, and effects he pleases — may not establish a constitution
whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much
as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as one
with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in
rewards, or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt.
As I said before,
all oneness in created things, whence qualities and relations are derived,
depends on a divine constitution that is arbitrary, in every other
respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom which is
exercised in these constitutions, appears in these two things. First, in
a beautiful analogy and harmony with other laws or
constitutions, especially, relating to the same subject; and secondly, in
the good ends obtained, or useful consequences of such a
constitution. If therefore there be any objection still lying against this
constitution with Adam and his posterity, it must be, that it is not
sufficiently wise in these respects. But what extreme arrogance would
it be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of the
laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the
universe! And not only so, but if this constitution, in particular, be well
considered, its wisdom, in the two forementioned respects, may easily be made
evident. There is an apparent manifold analogy to other constitutions and
laws, established and maintained through the whole system of vital nature in
this lower world; all parts of which, in all successions, are derived from the first
of the kind, as from their root, or fountain; each deriving from thence all
properties and qualities, that are proper to the nature and capacity of the
species: no derivative having any one perfection, unless it be what is
merely circumstantial, but what was in its primitive. And that Adam’s
posterity should be without that original righteousness, which Adam had
lost, is also analogous to other laws and establishments, relating to the
nature of mankind; according to which, Adam’s posterity have no one perfection
of nature, in any kind, superior to what was in him, when the human race began
to be propagated from him.
And as such a
constitution was fit and wise in other respects, so it was in this that
follows. Seeing the divine constitution concerning the manner of mankind
coming into existence, was such as did so naturally unite them, and make
them in so many respects one, naturally leading them to a close union in
society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual dependence — things were wisely
so established, that all should naturally be in one and the same moral state;
and not in such exceeding different states, as that some should be perfectly
innocent and holy, but others corrupt and wicked; some needing a Savior,
but others needing none; some in a confirmed state of perfect happiness,
but others in a state of public condemnation to perfect and eternal misery; some
justly exposed to great calamities in this world, but others by their innocence
raised above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state would by no means
have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and unavoidable
situation and circumstances of the world of mankind; all made of one blood,
to dwell on all the face of the earth, to be united and blended in society,
and to partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of this lower
world.
Dr. T. urges (Page
14), that sorrow and shame are only for personal sin; and it has
often been urged, that repentance can be for no other sin. To which I
would say, that the use of words is very arbitrary: but that men’s hearts
should be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the
pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think, is not
in the least unreasonable. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that
men should be ashamed of things done by others, in whom they are
nearly concerned. I am sure, it is not unscriptural; especially when they
are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the disposition of their
hearts, as fully consenting and concurring.
From what has been
observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an
absurd and impossible thing, for the race of mankind truly to partake of the sin
of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall
become their sin; by virtue of a real union between the root and
branches of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence),
established by the author of the whole system of the universe; to whose
establishments are owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part
of that system; and by virtue of the full consent of the hearts of
Adam’s posterity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy
is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and
properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them.
By reason of the
established union between Adam and his posterity, the case is far
otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals
of Adam’s race; betwixt whom is no such constituted union: as, between
children and other ancestors. Concerning whom is apparently to be understood
that place, Eze. 18:1-20 (which Dr. T. alleges, p. 10, 11. S). Where God
reproves the Jews for the use they made of that proverb, “The fathers have
eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge;” and tells
them, that hereafter they shall no more have occasion to use this
proverb; and that if a son sees the wickedness of his father, and
sincerely disapproves it and avoids it, and he himself is
righteous, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; that all souls,
both the soul of the father and the son are his, and that therefore the son
shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of
the son; but the soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the righteousness of the
righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.
The thing denied, is communion in the guilt and punishment of the
sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam’s race; and expressly, in that
case, where there is no consent and concurrence, but a sincere
disapprobation of the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that children who
are adult and come to act for themselves, who are righteous, and
do not approve of, but sincerely condemn, the wickedness of their fathers,
shall not be punished for their disapproved and avoided iniquities. The occasion
of what is here said, as well as the design and plain sense, shows, that
nothing is intended in the least degree inconsistent with what has been
supposed concerning Adam’s posterity sinning and falling in his apostasy.
The occasion is, the people’s murmuring at God’s methods under the
Mosaic dispensation; agreeable to that in Lev. 26:39, “And they that are left
of you, shall pine away in their iniquity in their enemies’ land, and also in
the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them:” and other
parallel places, respecting external judgments, which were the punishments most
plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on, under that dispensation (which was,
as it were, an external and carnal covenant), and particularly the
people suffering such terrible judgments in Ezekiel’s time, for the sins of
Manasseh; according to what God says by Jeremiah (Jer. 15:4) and agreeable to
what is said in that confession, Lam. 5:7, “Our fathers have sinned and are
not, and we have borne their iniquities.”
In what is said
here, there is a special respect to the gospel-dispensation; as is greatly
confirmed by comparing this place with Jer. 31:29-31. Under which dispensation,
the righteousness of God’s dealings with mankind would be more fully
manifested, in the clear revelation then to be made of the method of God’s judgment,
by which the final state of wicked men is determined; which is not
according to the behavior of their particular ancestors; but everyone is
dealt with according to the sin of his own wicked heart, or sinful nature
and practice. The affair of derivation of the natural corruption of
mankind in general, and of their consent to, and participation of,
the primitive and common apostasy, is not in the least
intermeddled with, by anything meant in the true scope and design of this place
in Ezekiel.
On the whole, if
any do not like the philosophy or the metaphysics (as some perhaps
may choose to call it) made use of in the foregoing reasonings; yet I cannot
doubt, but that a proper consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in fact,
with respect to the dependence of the state and course of things in the
universe on the sovereign constitutions of the supreme Author and Lord of
all — who gives account to none of any of his matters, and whose
ways are past finding out — will be sufficient, with persons of common
modesty and sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions
against the justice of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully
taught in his holy word, concerning the derivation of depravity
and guilt from Adam to his posterity.
This is enough, one
would think, forever to silence such bold expressions as these — ”If this be
just, — if the Scriptures teach such doctrine, etc. then the
Scriptures are of no use — understanding is no understanding,
— and, what a GOD must he be, that can thus curse innocent
creatures! — Is this thy GOD. O Christian!” — etc., etc.
It may not be
improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter, in which
we have had occasion to say so much about the imputation of Adam’s sin)
concerning the opinions of two divines, of no inconsiderable note among
the dissenters in England, relating to a partial imputation of
Adam’s first sin.
One of
them supposes, that this sin, though truly imputed to INFANTS, so that
thereby they are exposed to a proper punishment, yet is not imputed to
them in such a degree, as that upon this account they should be liable to
eternal punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to temporal
death, or annihilation; Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made
infinitely more guilty by it, than his posterity. On which I would
observe; that to suppose, God imputes not all the guilt of Adam’s sin,
but only some little part of it, relieves nothing but one’s imagination.
To think of poor little infants bearing such torments for Adam’s sin,
as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and
annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their
suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one’s reason.
There is no rule of reason, that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin
in the whole of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not
personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and
punished in part. For all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the imputation;
not the quantity or degree of what is imputed. If there be any
rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or
communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not act; then
it lies against all that is of this nature. The force of the reasons
brought against imputing Adam’s sin to his posterity (if there be any force in
them) lies in this, That Adam and his posterity are not one. But this
lies as properly against charging a part of the guilt, as the whole. For
Adam’s posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a little
of what was done, than the whole. They were as absolutely free from being
concerned in that act partly, as they were wholly. And there is no
reason to be brought, why one man’s sin cannot be justly reckoned to
another’s account, who was not then in being, in the whole of it; but
what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to him in any part,
so as that he should be subject to any condemnation or punishment on that
account. If those reasons are good, all the difference is this; that to
bring a great punishment on infants for Adam’s sin, is a great act
of injustice, and to bring a comparatively smaller punishment, is a smaller
act of injustice; but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an
act of injustice, as the other.
To illustrate this
by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argument why I may not exact
from one of my neighbors, what was due to me from another, that he and
my debtor are not the same; and that their concerns, interests,
and properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good, it lies as
truly against my demanding from him a part of the debt, as the whole.
Indeed it is a greater act of injustice for me to take from him the whole
of it, than a part; but not more truly and certainly an act of
injustice.
The other divine
thinks, there is truly an imputation of Adam’s sin, so that infants cannot be
looked upon as innocent creatures; yet seems to think it not agreeable
to the perfections of God, to make the state of infants in another world worse
than a state of nonexistence. But this to me appears plainly a giving
up of that grand point of imputation, both in whole and in part. For
it supposes it to be no right, for God to bring any evil on a child of
Adam, which is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it, or
balancing it with good; so that still the state of the child shall be as good
as could be demanded in justice, in case of mere innocence.
Which plainly supposes, that the child is not exposed to any proper punishment
at all, or is not at all in debt to divine justice, on account of
Adam’s sin. For if the child were truly in debt, then surely justice
might take something from him, without paying for it, or
without giving that which makes its state as good, as mere innocence
could in justice require. If he owes the suffering of some punishment,
then there is no need that justice should requite the infant for
suffering that punishment; or make up for it, by conferring some good,
that shall countervail it, and in effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the
whole, good and evil shall be at even balance, yea, so that
the scale of good shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a
judge, to order any quantity of money to be taken from another, without paying
him again, and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly forfeited
one at all.
It seems to me
pretty manifest, that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real imputation
of the guilt of Adam’s first sin to his posterity, without owning that they
are justly treated as sinners, truly guilty, and children of
wrath, on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole
of the evil of that transgression; at least, all that pertains to the
essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant,
which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like
covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of
rebellion, violated it for himself.
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